Essay
The Sanctions Clause: What Ireland Cut from Europe's Sovereign Cloud Law
The EU's Cloud and AI Development Act should stop foreign governments switching off European public services. The Council's first compromise text deletes the clause that covered sanctions.

In May 2025 the Associated Press reported that Karim Khan, chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, had lost access to his Microsoft email after the United States put him under sanctions. Microsoft says it never stopped providing services to the court, and the two sides still disagree about who switched what off. Either way, a government outside Europe sanctioned a person working inside it, and his account at an American provider stopped working.
I had a much smaller version of this in April, when a terms-of-service change cut off the AI I write with. I wrote about it at the time. For one person the fix was a download and a loud fan. A court can’t do that.
The EU’s Cloud and AI Development Act is meant to deal with this. The Commission proposed it in June. Amazon, Microsoft and Google hold about 70% of Europe’s cloud market, and the law would create four “Union assurance levels” that measure how far a cloud service can be controlled or switched off from outside the Union. Public bodies doing sensitive work would have to buy at the higher levels.
The Council is now negotiating its version, and Ireland chairs those talks until the end of December. Microsoft and Google have their European headquarters there, and data centres use about a fifth of the country’s electricity. On 30 October the Irish presidency sent governments its first compromise text on the part of the law that deals with autonomy, and Agence Europe published it. I compared it line by line with the Commission’s proposal.
The clause that went missing
The Commission’s text had two sentences about sanctions. To count as “associated”, which lets its providers reach the third assurance level, a non-EU country must have “no measures in place to oblige the cloud computing service provider to implement, enforce, give effect to, or comply with restrictive measures such as sanction regimes, embargoes”, unless EU or national law makes them legitimate. And a provider under foreign control, at levels two and three, had to show that this control could not oblige it to apply foreign sanctions.
The Irish text deletes both. Its explanatory note says they were already covered by another rule, which bans foreign governments from forcing providers to “degrade or disrupt service continuity”. In the ICC case the court’s service kept running while one person, targeted by name, was cut off. A rule about service continuity doesn’t reach that, and the sentence that did is gone.

Telemetry with the definitions left blank
The second change is a new sentence at the first three levels. Metadata and telemetry may be processed or transferred outside the Union “to the extent strictly necessary and proportionate to ensure the cybersecurity protection” of the service, “subject to fully auditable transparency, monitoring and security obligations”, and only if this “cannot be reasonably achieved” inside the EU.
There is a real technical case behind it. Large providers spot attacks by comparing signals across thousands of customers, and that works better with global data. Most of that value, though, comes from derived indicators such as attacker addresses and file fingerprints, which can leave without anyone’s identity attached. The raw telemetry of a ministry or a hospital says who logged in, when, from where and what they opened.
The draft doesn’t define what it lets out. Its list of definitions reads, literally, “’telemetry data’ means […]” and “‘metadata’ means […]”. The provider decides what is “strictly necessary”, and the text doesn’t say who audits it. France already asks for more. Its SecNumCloud standard requires security supervision to run from the EU and technical data such as logs and identities to stay there, and S3NS, the joint venture of Google and Thales, qualified under it last December.
Smaller changes, in both directions
The rest of the text moves in the same direction in smaller steps. In the Commission’s version customer data stays in the Union unless the buyer “explicitly requires otherwise”; in the Irish one, unless it “explicitly allows otherwise”. That change matters less than it looks, since both need an explicit decision, but the presidency’s note doesn’t mention it. The highest level, which had no opt-out at all, gets one. At level three, the line saying the audited provider “should allow for reasonable access to the code” disappears, also without comment.
Some changes go the other way. Customers get the right to use their own identity systems and to read the logs of who accessed their data. Three or more member states can ask the Commission to review a country’s associated status. The duty to buy certified services is extended to water, energy, transport and other utilities.
“But governments should decide”
The strongest defence of the Irish text is that it moves power from Brussels to the capitals. The Commission could no longer set binding assurance levels for public-sector work, only recommendations that member states must answer within three months, and it loses the power to extend the rules to private companies. The note also says the text reflects what member states asked for, and several of them pushed against sovereignty rules when the EU’s cloud certification scheme was negotiated.
Both points are fair. But a procurement officer in a hospital facing a hyperscaler’s legal department signs the contract on the table, and so does a small member state negotiating alone. The law does let them buy together through the Commission, but those tools are weak. When three foreign firms hold 70% of a market, leaving the decision to buyers who can’t say no means the seller makes it.
Security and industry need different rules
Defending against the cloud Europe already depends on won’t produce a European one. I think the law mixes up two goals.
The first is security. Sensitive public data should stay out of reach of foreign law permanently, the way defence procurement works. Trade law allows that when it is necessary and proportionate. The test should be whether a provider is immune to foreign orders, which any company can meet through how it is structured. The proposal’s level three looks at who controls the provider instead, and that is harder to defend under WTO rules.
The second is industrial policy: helping European providers grow. That needs protection too, but temporary and conditional. WTO procurement rules have no exception for infant industries, so the preference belongs where they don’t apply: smaller contracts, research and pre-commercial purchases, and funding like the €1.2 billion the EU approved for cloud projects in 2023. It also needs milestones and an end date. In 2012 France put about €150 million of public money into two national cloud champions, Cloudwatt and Numergy, with no performance conditions. Numergy’s revenue in 2014 was around €2 million, most of it from its own shareholder. Cloudwatt closed in 2020. Airbus worked because it had to sell abroad from the start.
What I would ask for
Put the sanctions clause back. Define telemetry and metadata, approve each category of data that leaves the EU when a service is certified, and publish the list. Set the security tier at the level France already applies. Keep the industrial lever separate, with numbers and a date when it ends.
In the Parliament, one of the two rapporteurs, the Dutch Volt MEP Reinier van Lanschot, put it this way: “Our critical systems run on someone else’s technology, and someone else can switch it off. Today a court, tomorrow a ministry, a hospital, a grid operator?” The two institutions will have to agree on one text next year. I expect the Parliament to try to restore the sanctions clause in some form, and the Council to keep the telemetry exception with definitions added. Whether the clause comes back will show what this law is for.
Sources
- Irish EU Council Presidency scales back CADA autonomy provisions in first compromise text — Agence Europe
- Proposal for a Cloud and AI Development Act, COM(2026) 502 — European Commission
- Trump's sanctions on ICC's chief prosecutor have halted tribunal's work — Associated Press
- EU lawmakers push to reduce Europe's dependence on foreign cloud providers — Euronews